

# ANALYSIS ON A EXTREMELY SECURED MN-HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION METHOD DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING USING VLSI TECHNOLOGY

<sup>1</sup>P.Giri Prasad, <sup>2</sup>V.Sudheer, <sup>3</sup>S.Venkatesh, <sup>4</sup>V. Kusuma Priya

<sup>1,2,3</sup>Dept of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Sree Venkateswara College Of Engineering, Nellore (Dt), Andhra Pradesh, India.

<sup>4</sup>Dept of Computer Science and Engineering, Sree Venkateswara College Of Engineering, Nellore (Dt), Andhra Pradesh, India.

## ABSTRACT

The traditional encryption solutions are not entirely secure from an intermediate service like cloud servers because of the privacy leakage of sensitive data. A unique type of encryption method that can address security and privacy concerns is homomorphic encryption. This contains three security steps, namely key creation, encryption, and decryption, as opposed to public key encryption. The design and implementation of highly secure MN-homomorphic encryption on a VLSI platform are done in this research. In comparison to current norms, this system will offer superior security and resource efficiency. Private information and data integrity are both guaranteed by fully homomorphic encryption and decoding. The major goal is to make operations go more quickly. S-Box is first provided with input bits and a key. Then, bits are replaced using S-Box. Aftershiftingoperationisperformedtothesubstitutedbits.Nowthesebitsareencryptedusing MM homomorphic encryption. Hence MM homomorphic encryption improved safety compared to survive one.

**Key Words:** Homomorphic encryption, LargeInteger Multiplication, Operand Reduction, VLSIArchitecture, S-Box.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The majority of board systems' databases use fully homomorphic encryption (DMBS). a number of the current issues concerning the usage of databases is the test of verifying and securely preserving the legal handling of sensitive data in the distant database. Cryptography allows for the protection of the privacy of sensitive data. It's possible that using clever encryption techniques to store data in distant databases will significantly lessen how the framework is presented without interpretation. To solve the problem, MIT evaluates the cryptographic system that is on display. The server can perform SUM, AVG, and Count queries on encoded data thanks to the use of additively homomorphic cryptography; the other SQL queries make use of unique encryption calculations with crucial practicality. By adjusting totally homomorphic cryptosystems, it will still be possible to carry out routine database operations on encoded data without compromising the confidentiality of the data. In any case, there are important requirements for operational characteristics and computational unpredictability that such a cryptosystem has to satisfy. A significant advancement in recent years in the field of cryptography is Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). Without sacrificing the meaning of the plain text, it is possible to use an FHE plan to conduct computations on figure material [1]. As a result, a workable FHE plan will pave the way for a number of new security developments and application-related protections, such as privacy safeguarding the defence and cloud-based processing. FHE can often be categorised under three groups: cross-sectional, numerical, and learning-through-mistakes. Moderating the incredibly high computational complexity and resource requirements is one of the basic challenges in developing FHE applications [2]. For instance, implementing FHE in advanced PCs still consumes a significant amount of computation time, particularly for accomplishing the massive whole number duplication that frequently involves countless numbers of bits. Bit

increase the needed for the small setting with a grid measurement for cross section-based FHE. Various efficient approaches have been put forth to address the substantial whole number duplicate in order to speed up the FHE tasks. The objective of this article is to bring back native encryption in all number-based systems FHE using FPGA advancement. Given the less uncertain theory, more modest key size, and equivalent implementation, this specific FHE count was chosen. Additionally, the addition of aggregated FHE plots over all of the data promises future capability advancements. In these FHE plans, augmentation is a crucial component of the characteristics in the encryption, unscrambling, and assessment processes. In addition, referred equipment and GPU utilisation of other FHE designs have recently employed broad full number FFT duplication. Future research will examine how the gear multiplier affects replacement walks inside the FHE plot. Specifically, providing the fundamental encryption hardware implementation rough needed for FHE across the numbers.

In order to ensure confidentiality of information on untrusted servers, ULLY homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables computations to be performed directly on ciphertexts, garnering a lot of interest for applications that use cloud computing. Lattice-based, integer-based [3] and (ring) training with errors are the three general subcategories of FHE. Mitigating the incredibly high computational complexity and demand for resources is one of the key hurdles in ensuring the creation of effective FHE applications. For instance, software FHE solutions in high-performance computers [4], [5] still require an enormous amount of calculation time, especially when performing massive integer multiplication, which typically comprises more than a few hundred thousand bits. For lattice-based FHE, a tiny configuration that has a lattice dimension of 2048 needs to be multiplied by 785 006 bits.

## 2. RELATED WORK

The bootstrapping process is used in Gentry's strategy to transition from a partially homomorphic cryptography plot to a fully homomorphic encryption plot. The encoder may utilise a particular measure homomorphic encryption scheme to evaluate as much of the figure material as possible, using the combined private key, which is a touch of open key, to determine if an understood substance is going to be pointlessly monstrous or extremely clamorous expansion is illegal. Therefore, this encryption method again encrypts plaintext, which isn't all that exciting but is instead constantly irrelevant. It is essential to use a virtually homomorphic plan that could securely jumble your private key and attest the accuracy as much as possible in order to maintain an amazing sequence of action. The reasonably homomorphic cryptosystem is used for this necessities are safely scramble its private key and arranged for assessing the unscramble work. In this manner, the Gentry makes use of the separating that grants unscrambling to fill out the point of breaking that a homomorphic cryptosystem may, to some extent, evaluate. The ideal cross fragments and both assignments have to be accessible over the rings for homomorphicity such as those in high society's homomorphic encryption scheme. The barriers in Gentry's completely homomorphic encryption scheme are absurd (they only comprehend a tiny portion of the key's and figure structures at once), but they actually rely on the novel and unassumingly unproven cryptographic locals. One year after the first completely homomorphic encryption scheme was hatched, Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and Vaikuntanathan suggested a completely homomorphic encryption scheme that makes use of simple solitary number juggling (which works across integers) and Gentry's methodology to change over to some degree homomorphic cryptosystem to absolutely homomorphic encryption plot. The primary issue in electronic communication is safety, which aims to safeguard each person's private information. Each form of cryptography technique that has been developed is remarkably appropriate for a certain application. Hash functions are another type of cryptography technology mentioned before that encrypts data without the usage of keys. It is not appropriate for applications with weak security. Because public key encryption utilises two keys for scrambling and unwinding, the goal of safety can be achieved. One key is used to verify the user, while the other is used to decode content. Data transfer is started by the sender in the crossing network. The message is checked to see if it has been encoded using the public key. It ceases to send messages to another client if the



#### 4. PROPOSEDSYSTEM

The schematic representation of the suggested system is shown in figure (2) below. In comparison to current norms, this framework will offer superior security and utilisation of resources. Both privacy and integrity are guaranteed by fully homomorphic encryption and decryption methods. The major goal is to make operations go more quickly. S-Box is initially provided input bits and a key. Bits are then substituted with S-Box. after the bits that were swapped have undergone NTT. Now, entirely homomorphic encryption is being used to encrypt these bits. The reverse encryption process works in the other direction. Each block's explanation is provided in depth.




Fig.2: PROPOSED SYSTEM

#### SUBSTITUTE BYTES TRANSFORMATION (S-BOX)

The Sub bytes step modifications are where the updated structure begins. This step's purpose is to replace the data in the S-box memory unit in the state by other data from another memory unit. Confusion is caused by the way that data is distributed throughout memory units. This Shannon's elements for scientific constraint arrangement's primary goal is to promote security. Safety of information is the main goal of byte substitution.

#### ENCRYPTION

The secret data is encrypted using an encryption technique, which consists of a series of intricate mathematical operations. The sender uses the encryption key as one of the inputs to the encryption algorithm in addition to the plain text to produce the cypher text.

#### Shift Rows Transformation

Bytes are substituted after the shift row transformation step. This process involves moving the bytes that are present in each row. Shifting is frequently done either to the left or right side. Circular shift is the type of shifting used in the row conversion. As it is a circular shift, the first row is shifted one byte to the left in this step, with the leftmost byte moving to the right side of the row. The third row shifts three places left and the second row moves two bytes in the same direction. As a result, the resultant matrix's size remains unchanged, though the byte places will vary.

Figures (3) and (4) below depict the suggested system's RTL schematic and technologies schematic.




Fig.3: RTL SCHEMATIC OF PROPOSED SYSTEM



Fig.4:TECHNOLOGY SCHEMATIC OF PROPOSED SYSTEM




Fig.5: OUTPUT WAVE FORM OF PROPOSED SYSTEM

Table.1: COMPARISON TABLE

S.NO	Parameters	Existing System	Proposed System
1	Memory Used	3698723 Kilo Bytes	3702060 Kilo Bytes
2	Total Delay	4.103 ns	3.806 ns
3	Logic Delay	0.210 ns	0.301 ns
4	Route Delay	3.893 ns	3.505 ns

## CONCLUSION

In this design and implementation of high secure VLSI based MN homomorphic encryption was implemented. A projected core area has been synthesized for the suggested system. According to the homomorphic criteria, MM homomorphic encryption conducts the procedure. In a single clock cycle, the bits will be shifted by the public and private keys. Test outcomes show that the suggested solution is quicker than the CPU and provides security in an effective manner.

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